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DAVIs AND DIscaxvioNAY JUsTIcE
Although he subtitled Discretionary Justice a "preliminary" inquiry, Kenneth Culp
Davis made a definitive addition to the literature and public understanding of the
administrative process through his Edward Douglass White Lectures that engendered
the volume.
In reviewing Davis's Administrative Law Teeatise2 a decade earlier, I had thought
it a remarkable compilation and evaluation of court cases dealing with administrative
agency practices and procedures, as well as the most comprehensive examination of
the relationship to administrative law of such central legal concepts as stare decisis,
res judicata, estoppel, official notice, ripeness, primary jurisdiction, and exhaustion
of remedies.3 Although he recognized that many principles of administrative law,
because of confusing or conflicting authorities, could not be asserted with certainty,
Davis's objective as author of the Treatise was to make a systematic statement of
principles derived from the huge mass of administrative law that had sprung up in
recent decades. The data he examined were primarily Supreme Court decisions and
lower court opinions that were based on agency rules, adjudications, and practices
related to them. Unsurprisingly, the evaluations he made consisted primarily of
learned observations and incisive critiques of what the courts had said and done
in response to what agenties had said and done.
My principal reservation about the Treatise was that it focused much more on
formal law than on administration, more on the delineation of legal principles than
on processes of decision-making. As a consequence, little was done to meet the
concern of practitioners, administrators, and students about how administrative law
develops and functions in reality. To the extent that Davis was then concerned with
discretion at all, his emphasis was on judicial rather than on administrative dis-
cretion. Even in his examination of institutional decisionS, Davis dealt mainly with
the formal aspects of administrative problems. He discussed, for example, the extent
to which deciding officers must personally consider evidence, the consultation of
staff by examiners and agency heads; and the absences of or substitution's for officers
and agency heads in decision sessions. Implicit in his analysis was the view that
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the universe of administrative law was hierarchical, with the judiciary at its apex.
He supported judicial discretion in applying rules such as exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies because he believed the quest for "a neat word formula" that
could eliminate discretion in determining when to grant judicial relief to be futile,
if not undesirable. To channel the judiciary's discretion, he proposed consideration
of such factors as the extent of injury a petitioner might suffer through delay, the
degree of apparent clarity or doubt of administrative jurisdiction, and the sig-
nificance of specialized administrative understanding.0
Discretion became a central, rather than a peripheral, concern to Davis during
the i96o's, and Discretionary Justice was a major product of the broadening of his
insights and inquiries. His objective shifted from a predominant effort to codify the
law of the past and admonish judges about the law of the future to an emphasis
on the primacy of discretion in administration at all levels. He sought "to dispel
the virtually universal impression that discretionary justice is too elusive for study,
... to opef up problems that seem susceptible of further research and thinking, and
. . . to formulate a framework for further study."" No longer preoccupied with
the quest for judge-made principles of administrative law, Davis focused on the
quality of justice in all facets of the administrative process and stressed that the
strongest need and greatest promise for improving that quality for individuals "are
in the areas where decisions necessarily depend more upon discretion' than upon
rules and principles and where formal hearings and judicial review are mostly
irrelevant."7
The key question he now posed was, how can we reduce injustice to individuals
from the exercise of discretionary power? His framework for developing an
answer was simple: unnecessary discretionary power should be cut back and the
discretionary power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, struc-
tured, and checked. Since this formulation constitutes an approach to an answer,
rather than the answer itself, a critic would have to yield to cavil at this stage to
denigrate Davis's contribution by attacking the vagaries of meaning of "necessary."
One could draw on Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland to argue that
necessary means convenient, or one could insist on confining the term to essentiality
or indispensability to a goal or achievement.' The point is that Davis did not stop
with enunciation of the "necessary" and "properly confined" criteria. He rejected
s TaSr 67-69.
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as a false hope the sharper delineation of statutory standards and pointed out the
incongruity of the non-delegation doctrine in light of the reality of the common-
place power of selective enforcement Instead, he espoused administrative rule-
making as the key to proper confinement and control of discretion. He insisted
that "agencies through rule-making can often move from vague or absent statutory
standards to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and understand-
ing develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when the subject matter permits, to
precise and detailed rules."9
Concomitantly with his proposal for enlarged rule-making, he urged openness
as a means for structuring discretionary power. He saw openness as a natural enemy
of arbitrariness and called for open plans, open policy statements, and open findings
and reasons in situations warranting informal discretionary action as well as in
more formal realms of decision-makingY° With regard to the bearing of appeals
on checking discretion, he noted that the natural system of administrative appeals
from subordinates to superiors is less desirable than appeals to independent officers.
An independent ombudsman could be a more effective critic of administration than
a.superior officer or a legislator. Davis was especially concemed about reducing
powers of lenience and privilege since "the inescapable reality" is that the dis-
cretion of public officers to confer privileges or to be lenient, is power susceptible to
abuses including the most egregious forms of discrimination, favoritism and caprice.11
The Davis of the White Lectures was more sensitive to and perceptive of realities
of regulation than the Davis of the Treatise. It would have been unthinkable for
the author of the Treatise to conclude, as Davis does in Discretionary justice, that
"our jurisprudence of statutes and of judge-made law is overdeveloped; our juris-
prudence of administrative justice, of police justice of prosecutor justice--of dis-
cretionary justice-is underdeveloped, We need a new jurisprudence that will
encompass all of justice, not just the easy half of it."''
Without claiming that all that has been done in administrative law and process
research since the publication of Discretionary Justice is rooted in Davis, one can
still justifiably credit him with commencing, inspiring, and spurring significant new
probes of the nuances of administrative discretion that would otherwise have been
neglected or discarded. Several prototypes of projects that are at least compatible
with Davis's observations and admonitions are worth considering. Lest the reader
conclude that my response to the "Discretionary" Davis is ioo per cent encomium, it
should be added that I am not yet persuaded that too little discretion is not as
often to blame for denials of justice as too much discretion. In developing projects
and in planning and allocating funds for research, I think it essential that we
devote equal amounts of intellectual energy -and tangible resources to probing positive
0 DiscRnONrAY JusnTCe 219.
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relationships between discretion and justice as we do to their dysfunctional inter-
actions.
II
PROTOTYPES OF PROJECTS ON PoucE DISCRETION
Davis observed that -the police constitute one of the most important policy making
agencies of our society since "they make far more discretionary determinations in
individual cases than any other class of administrators."18 He also found the amount
of police activity measured in man hours to be more than forty times as great
as the amount of governmental activity through all seven of the major independent
regulatory agencies. Although he was not the discoverer of the discretionary di-
mensions of police work, Davis's work has shown the suitability and feasibility of
intensive research on policies, -procedures, and programs of the police.' 4 A current
project at Northwesterv University and an emergent one at Arizona State University
help to illustrate the potentialities, if not yet the benefits, of implementing Davis's
proposals.
In an attempt to discernt patterns in the conduct of police toward civilians in
Chicago, the Law Enforcement Study Group, a joint research project of the Center
for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University and a dozen other Chicago area
organizations, undertook to examine policies and practices governing the use of
fatal force by police officers. Little data of record was available prior to this study.
Even when complaints were solicited or registered the information was usually
considered too sensitive and controversial for public examination. A basic objective
of the study was to determine the adequacy of institutions and mechanisms for
reviewing incidents involving fatal force.
Through the Police Weapons Center of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, comparative statistical information on killings of and by police was col-
lected on each of the five largest U.S. cities according to the i97o census. The death
rate of civilians from police actions per iooooo population was found to be highest
in Chicago--o.95 from July 1970 to March 1971 as compared to o.27 in New York,
0.28 in Los Angeles, o.26 in Detroit, and 0.67 in' Philadelphia.1" Chicago also scored
highest on the civilian death rate per iooo police officers-2.53 compared with o.66 in
New York, 1.i8 in Los Angeles, 0.77 in Detroit, and i.67 in Philadelphia.'0 With
15Id. at 222-23, 81.1 4 An excellent selected bibliography of both early and recent research into police roles, functions
and discretion is found in AmamcAc BAR AssoCIAT ON Pao7Ear oN STANr>ARDS FOR CrIMINAL JuMCE,
Tim UrBAN PoLcE FtmC1ON 296-303 (1972) (tentative draft). This comprehensive report draws heavily
on Davis in developing and supporting its recommendations that "[p]olice discretion can best be structured
and controlled through the process of administrative rule-making by police agencies. Police administrators
should, therefore, give the highest priority to the formulation of administrative rules governing the
exercise of discretion, particularly in the areas of selective enforcement, investigative techniques and
enforcement methods." Id. at X25-133.
"
5 Law Enforcement Study Group, The Police and Their Use of Fatal Force in Chicago, 6 (x972).
" Id. at so.
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regard to police fatalities during the same period, Chicago was the highest with 7
and second highest in ratio of police deaths to department size.
Although the researchers could obtain statistical summaries and other aggregate
data from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, individual departments,
including the Chicago Police Department, were reluctant to make available their
data on individual cases involving civilian deaths. As a consequence, one of the
investigative research techniques employed was to identify incidents of civilian
deaths at the hands of police reported in Chicago newspaper files. This information
was then used to locate transcripts of inquests at the Cook County Coroner's office.
Selected characteristics of the civilians who died were recorded by race, age, and
sex; the locations of the fatal incidents were plotted on a map of Chicago; and what-
ever information was available on the characteristics of the policemen involved was
analyzed. 70.9% of the civilian!s who died were black males, 3.9% were black females,
24% were white males and x.3% were unidentified. 7 The death rate by race per
Ioo,ooo population was found to be 5.35 for blacks and o.86 for whites. The authors
noted that during 1969 and i97o, a black person in Chicago was more than six times
as likely to die at the hands of police than a white person.' 8 Comparing the death
rate with arrests, they found that blacks had a 2.oi death rate per io,ooo arrests of
blacks, whereas whites had a i.oo rate per ioooo arrests of whites.',
The researchers next analyzed the standards governing police use of fatal force
and the structures and mechanisms for review of such force. Statutory standards of
the state criminal law and administrative standards of the police department both
govern review. The administrative standards showed that officers are specifically
prohibited from firing into crowds; firing over the heads of crowds, except on specific
order of a member of the Department above the rank of Captain; firing at a fleeing
car, except one in which a person who has attempted or committed a forcible felony
is riding; firing warning shots in the case of individuals where the use of deadly
force is not permitted; and firing into a building or through doors when the person
fired at is not dearly visible.20 In addition, an official Chicago police training bulletin
cautions the officer to use "every possible means at his disposal" to avoid a killing
and reminds him of the possibility of prosecution for voluntary manslaughter.2 '
Several different public bodies, including the internal division of the police
department, the Cook County coroner, and the State's Attorney, were found to have
authority and formal responsibility in review of cases of civilian death. Of 76 cases
examined that involved fatal police force, the police pressed charges in two, the
state's attorney presented charges to a grand jury in four, and a grand jury in-
dicted a policeman and a trial was conducted in one. The coroner's office exonerated
7 Id. at i9.
'old. at 20.
'old. at 21.
201d. at 30-32.
211d. at 32.
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the police in all but two of the 76 cases, the same two in which the police depart-
ment pressed charges. The authors of the report found that in 28 of the cases
the evidence showed violations of administrative guidelines during the fatal incident.
Ten of the 28 indicated substantial likelihood of criminal misconduct by the
police.22 No administrative discipline measures were found to have been taken in
any of these 28 cases. The researchers concluded that the public cannot be assured
of the integrity of the police review process. As a result of the wide disparity between
cases warranting official action and those in which action actually was taken, the
authors called for a re-examination of the review system to determine whether and
how structural defects contribute to the inadequacy of the examination of police
use of fatal force. Two defects in the system of reviewing police use of fatal
force--both of them consistent with Davis's critique-were cited for combining to
compromise the integrity of the review process: "The agencies in the system have
a close working relationship, an arrangement which precludes independent exam-
ination within the system; the review proceedings are conducted almost entirely
out of view of the public, an arrangement which precludes independent examination
from without."2' 4
The Chicago report was obviously controversial and could be transformed wholly
into political fodder in an election year. Needless to say, performance of such a
project by the faculty and students of a university requires exceptional stress on
objectivity, depth, and fairness. At the same time, the capacity of a university
to accept leadership in research that has immediate public policy implications has
added significantly to the checks and balances over arbitrary uses of discretion.
A more direct implementation of Davis's urgings about research into police
discretion may be found in the Center recently established at Arizona State Uni-
versity Law School for study and research into police administrative law. Directed
by Professor Gerald Caplan, previously general counsel of the District of Columbia
Police Department, the first project of the Center will be a study of rule-making
in law enforcement agencies. Davis's observation that "no other agency, so far as
I know, does so little supervising of vital policy determinations which directly involve
justice or injustice to individuals"2 5 was invoked as a demonstration of the need for
the new Center, along with the exhortation of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice to police to develop and articulate
concrete policies. 6 The objective of the Center is not simply to survey and report
on police policies and practices. Its active goal will be "to transform law enforce-
ment agencies from comparatively passive and lethargic bodies, ever responding to
22 1 d. at 62.
20 Id. at 63-64.
24 Id. at 72.
" DIscRETIONARY JoUSTCE 88.
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the cues or dictates of others, most notably the judiciary, into active initiators of
policies reflective of their own goals."'27
Discussions Caplan has had with police chiefs, legal advisors, and other police
officials have re-enforced Davis's contentions and shown a need for comprehensive
updating of existing police manuals. For example, one police chief told Caplan that
community concern over a recent shooting might have been alleviated had the
department had written statements of its rules and policies to present to the city
council and other concerned groups.
The Center will endeavor to fashion model administrative orders for law en-
forcement agencies in such specific areas as service of arrest and search warrants,
problems associated with stop and frisk and field interrogation, finger-printing
policies, the settlement of minor disputes among neighbors and within the family,
development of a citation and summons system, problems associated with vagrancy
and disorderly conduct statutes, and policies relating to freedom of assembly and
grievance procedures. The Center hopes to involve in its efforts groups often critical
of the police, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Urban Coalition, legal
services organizations and anti-poverty organizations. Interest irn participation in the
work of the Center has been manifested by a number of major city police depart-
ments including Kansas City, Phoenix, Dallas, San Antonio, San Diego, Oakland,
New York, and Washington, D.C. Students at the Arizona State Law School will
assist in the research along with the director, deputy director, junior attorney and
participating consultants.
As prototypes of university involvement in appraising and assisting community
needs, the Law Enforcement Study Group and the Center for Police Administrative
Law are not expected to produce panaceas for the problems of police discretion.
They can, however, help to institutionalize, channel and direct discretion toward
constructive ends by giving visibility to basic information otherwise submerged or
secreted and by developing proposals that can be weighed in politically neutral
settings.
III
RESEARCH ABOUT POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN OMBUDSMEN'S R OLES
Like the university researcher, the ombudsman is usually outside the system
he examines and his only real power is that which prestige and public opinion may
accord him. A recent proposal to experiment with ombudsman-like roles for social
workers and a report on performance of such roles by state lieutenant governors
suggest the feasibility of additional checks on administrative discretion, implementing
Davis's proposals, from inside operative administrative systems.
37 Caplan, Rulemaking in Law Enforcement Agencies: A Proposal for a Police Administrative Law
Center s-2 (1972) (mimeo). Professor Caplan has expanded the proposal for the Center into a law review
article, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAw & CoNm-an. PRoB. 500 (1971).
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A professor of social work at the University of Texas, for example, has con-
sidered the potential effectiveness of social workers as ombudsmen in the areas of
mental retardation, crime, delinquency, housing, and welfare administration.28 While
cognizant of Cloward's conclusion that there is no public commitment to justice,
equity, or dignity in the social welfare system, Professor Payne insists that there
are many opportunities for an ombudsman to help welfare department staffs improve
at least the administrative fairness of their programs even if they can't eliminate
public antipathy toward the poor2 Payne does not feel that the social worker's
position as an advocate of client interests in some instances would jeopardize the
objectivity deemed a hallmark of the ombudsman, for he believes that any om-
budsman must take on some dimensions of an advocate whenever he finds a citizen's
complaint is justified and seeks to have the government rectify the error ° Payne
is especially enthusiastic about the capacity of social workers to perform as om-
budsmen through impartial arbitration or neutral mediation in disputes between
client groups and public agencies. The social worker's opportunity and task in such
situations would be "to promote the public consensus that people-serving institutions
should in fact serve people and to facilitate the implementation of such service.""1
To protect impartiality and objectivity, Payne recommends that the social worker-
ombudsman be designated an employee of a public legislative body or a private council
of social agencies with funding authority, such as the United Fund, rather than
an employee of any of the agencies in whose disputes he will be called upon to
intervene. The relevance of law and public policy to ombudsmanship leads Payne
to propose curricular changes in social work education that would emphasize legal
doctrines and practices and also enable would-be ombudsmen to understand bureau-
cratic structure and organization beyond what is taught in the traditional social work
administration courses. Whether ombudsman's roles can be effectively performed
by social workers is conjectural of course. The obvious problem with Payne's pro-
posal is that public legislative bodies and private councils of agencies have no
guaranteed immunity against becoming partisans in conflict themselves. As Payne
suggests, however, the feasibility of social worker-ombudsmen could well be the
subject of active experimentation that could help, at the same time as it tested the
new role, to enhance social work's professional purpose and philosophy."2
In his study of lieutenant governors as political ombudsmen, Alan Wyner noted
at the outset that lieutenant governors differ from the traditional model of the
" Payne, Ombudsman Roles for Social Workers, 17 SOCIAL WoRK, January, 1972, 94. Earlier dis-
cussions of potentialities of social workers as ombudsmen were contained in Cloward, A. Ombudsman
for Whom?, 12 SocIAL Wou, April, 1967, at 117; Zweig, The Social Worker as Legislative Ombudsman,
14 SOCIAL WoRx, January, 1969, at 25; and Payne, An Ombudsman for the Retarded?, 8 MENTAL RErMAnA-
or, October, 1970, at 45.
"' Cloward, supra note 29. See also Cloward & Elman, Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State, 202
THE NATION 230 (x966).
80 Payne, Ombudsman Roles for Social Workers, supra note 28, at 98.
I5 1d. at 99.52 d. at xoo.
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ombudsman in two major ways. 3 Whereas traditional ombudsmen cannot hold
another public office during their terms and are rarely interested in future political
office, lieutenant governors are elected politicians with major responsibilities as well
as continuing political aspirations. Furthermore, whereas ombudsmen traditionally
owe their ultimate allegiance to the legislature, lieutenant governors are generally
executive officers with at least as much identification with the executive branch as
with the legislature. For lieutenant governors, "opportunities for conflict of interest
abound."34 Perhaps surprisingly, Wyner found that, in strictly quantitative terms
at least, such conflicts have not arisen ir the vast majority of instances thus farf 5
Focusing on the ombudsman experiences of Lieutenant Governors Mark Hogan
of Colorado, Paul Simon of Illinois, and Roberto Mondragon of New Mexico,
Wyner's study showed that the office of ombudsman had no indigenous attributes
that ordained it with any natural affinity for lieutenant governors. Each of the state
officials voluntarily and independently sought out the responsibility and established
his role as ombudsman-Simon and Mondragon in their platforms for office and
Hogan in the course of his inaugural speech. In Wyner's appraisal, "a combination
of personal political ambition, plus a genuine interest in resolving people's grievances
against administrative agencies provided the motivation for Hogan, Simon and
Mondragon to adopt political ombudsman roles."36 The public seemed to welcome
a new avenue of possible redress.
Welfare, employment, and licensing cases led in all three states for ombudsman
attention-the typical welfare complaint alleging wrongful diminution or in-
adequacy of benefits, the typical employment case alleging unfair personnel practices
by the state or a need and desire for a job, and the typical licensing case alleging
excessive delays or mistakes in handling automobile registration certificates and
drivers' licenses. The most common causes underlying complaints were delays
because of excessive paperwork, buckpassing, and inadequate understanding by
citizens of the law. 7
Office efficiency was not a hallmark of the lieutenant governors' ombudsman roles.
Procedures for complaint handling were developed ad hoc, staffing was sparse, and
formal records almost nonexistent. Yet office inefficiencies did not lead to operational
ineffectiveness. Thousands of citizens did receive hearings, and significant reductions
of friction between agencies and the public were achieved. Moreover, the political
ombudsmen were not politically embarrassed when they found that up to fifty per
cent of the submitted complaints were unjustified. They reported that they received
as many expressions of appreciation from initiators of complaints found after
investigation to be unjustified as from those whose complaints were found justified
" Wyner, Lieutenant Governors as Political Ombudsmen, 12 Bulletin of the Institute of Governmental
Studies of the University of California, No. 6 (1971).
a' Id. at 2.
35 Id.
Id.
, Id. at 3.
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and were remedied.38 One of the reasons for the high reported level of efficacy of
the lieutenant governors as ombudsmen stemmed from the routine, non-sensational
nature of the cases brought to their attention. The substance of the problems
had no major ramifications for political survival or advancement.
Wyner concluded that traditional ombudsmen probably enjoy greater public
credibility than the lieutenant governors since many citizens view the lieutenant
governor-ombudsman as a public relations gimmick to win votes. Nonetheless, "it
remains to be seen" whether traditional ombudsmen are more effective in the
American polity. In any event, Wyner found the political ombudsman's role viable
as long as he does not seek to perform his tasks for political advantage, has an
adequate staff, has at least tacit support from the chief executive, and has the
cooperation of agency personnel? 9
IV
Too MUcH v. Too LimrE DISCRETON
Consistent with Payne's stress on mediational aspects of the proposed social worker-
ombudsman role, Wyner found that relatively few cases pit the lieutenant governor-
ombudsman against agencies in an adversary position. Simply hearing the two
sides often allowed the lieutenant governor "to clear the air by informing both
parties of his findings."4" If a dominant need in effectuating redress for citizens
is for heightened mediational roles and if the great majority of complaints submitted
to the lieutenant governors concerned paperwork, buck-passing and inadequate under-
standing of the law, it should be apparent that, without detracting from the im-
portance of Davis's emphasis on confining discretion, we need to go beyond seeking
better checks and controls. We need equally to determine ways to stimulate imag-
inativeness, creativity and efficiency in the performance of administrative functions
and the delivery of services.
A research project to be undertaken by Professor Larry Hill of the University
of Oklahoma will help us to learn, with regard to the federal agencies at least, how
much of the problem of administrative discretion is arbitrariness through too much
discretion and how much of the problem is indecision and buck-passing because of
too little discretion.41 In his project prospectus Hill notes -the evidence of growing
public distrust of bureaucracy and comments that, although some citizens complain
about their treatment by administrative agencies, we still don't know enough about
the nature and subject of the complaints or about the processes and devices for
their resolution. In a comprehensive examination of what'he terms "the consumption-
complaints subsystem" of the American political system, Hill will identify com-
81d. at 5.
,'Id. at 5, 6.
40 id. at 4.
"
1 Hill, Relationships Between the Rulers and the Ruled: The Consumption of Government and the
Processing of Federal Complaints (mimeo) (1972).
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plainants and their complaints through analysis of the files of major agencie 4
Through interviews with samples of that population, as well as a random sample
of others who may or may not have been complainants, he will seek to measure
and interpret attitudes toward governmental agencies and to correlate experiences
and attitudes of his informants with their pertinent sociological, psychological, and
economic attributes.
Hill will also endeavor to evaluate relationships between ranges of agency dis-
cretion and their procedures and practices in responding to complaints 3 Building
on Discretionary Justice as well as on Gellhorn's When Americans Complain, he
will be able to speak authoritatively about which Americans complain about what
to whom and with what consequences in their relationships with the federal
bureaucracy 4 Of course, this assumes wholehearted cooperation by the agencies
with Hill, a state of affairs not invariably borne out by experience-as researchers
from Indiana University and the University of Illinois had occasion to learn recently.
Professors Julius Getman and Stephen Goldberg had to take their case to court
before the high degree of cooperation they -thought had been assured by the National
Labor Relations Board reached that level in fact. Getman and Goldberg, both former
NLRB attorneys, had a grant from the National Science Foundation to study voting
in elections ordered by the NLRB. Proposing to question willing employees about
their attitudes toward the bargaining-agent election process and especially about
the impact on their votes of campaign tactics utilized by employers and unions, the
professors asked the agency for the names and home addresses of employees eligible
to vote in the elections they were studying. The Board had established a structure
of rules governing the behavior of parties during a campaign, and the specific purpose
of the Getman-Goldberg study was to provide an empirical foundation for evaluating
these regulations35 In April, 197o, the Board denied them the voter lists on: the
ground that their study could upset the "laboratory conditions" necessary for con-
ducting a fair election. In August, after negotiations for the lists proved unfruitful,
the professors filed suit in the District Court, claiming that they were entitled to
the lists under the Freedom of Information Act 6 In January, 1971, the District
Court ruled that the NLRB had failed to establish that it had the authority or
discretion to withhold the requested information, a judgment that was stayed pend-
ing appeal. 7 On August 31, 1971, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the professors' position and commented that "the Board's position
suffers from the obvious self-justifying tendency of an institution which in over
30 years has itself never engaged in the kind of much needed systematic empirical
'
1 Id. at 4.
"Id. at 4-7.
"'"W. GF-LLEORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPIPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966).
"Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
j7 judge J. Skelly Wright reviewed the history of the case in the course of his Court of Appeals opinion
in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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effort to determine the dynamics of an election campaign or the type of conduct
which actually has a coercive impact."4
The experience of Getman and Goldberg, even with the delay of almost a year
and a half occasioned by the agency's intransigence and the time required for judicial
review, shows that redress through the adversary system may still, on occasion,
be the most effective means for coping with agency arbitrariness. Regardless of the
ultimate contribution of the Getman-Goldberg voting study, countless academic re-
searchers, including Professor Hill, may have occasion to be grateful to the two law
professors for establishing so stunningly the right to agency information in the
conduct of research.
Side by side with the glow of satisfaction left by the Court of Appeals ruling
in the Getman case, there is a malaise engendered by one aspect of the case. The
facts suggest that formulation of rules-which the NLRB had prescribed in abundant
detail for the conduct of elections-may freeze requirements into a time-worn and
dysfunctional mold that stifles innovation and change and evokes blatant arbitrariness
in its defense. In channeling and controlling discretion, rule-making must not prevent
or discourage reappraisals and revisions of rules. On the contrary, there ought to be
built-in provisions in rule-making proceedings for testing and evaluating the func-
tions and consequences of rules at regular intervals. Otherwise, the danger is that
the rules may vest, rust, and atrophy, but still be followed rigorously for perhaps
no other reason than that often cited by mountain climbers to explain their urges
to ascend, "because they're there." How to update and energize administrative prac-
tices, how to transcend the administrative syndrome of "I don't make the rules,
buddy, I just have to follow them" when the rules have become outmoded, and how
to achieve interactions between the public and administrators that deliver justice in
individual cases through allocation and chann'eling of discretion are at least as worthy
of attention as how to keep administrators from exercising discretion in whimsical,
arbitrary, and unjust ways.
In his discussion in the Treatise of interpretations of the rule that no one is
entitled to judicial relief until the prescribed administrative remedy has been ex-
hausted, Davis pointed out that the Supreme Court's holdings were often irreconcilable
and that "the word formulations in the opinions are inadequate, conflicting and
usually affirmatively misleading."49 He preferred the frank statement by the Court
of Claims in Adler v. US. 0 to the "Supreme Court's absolutes in either one direction
or the other.""' The Court of Claims had asserted that there is nb absolute require-
ment that a party exhaust his administrative remedies before coming into court.
"The court may entertain his suit before he has done so, if in its discretion it thinks
the circumstances make it appropriate to do so."52 Just as a "neat word formula"
' 1d. at 675.
9 TRA'nsE 67.
50 146 F. Supp. 956 (Ct. C1. 1956).
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for exercising such judicial discretion probably is not feasible r there are equal limits
and drawbacks to precise formulae for checking administrative discretion. Davis, of
course, recognizes this fact in Discretionary Justice when he rejects "the extravagant
version of the rule of law" that declares that legal rights may be finally determined
only by regularly constituted courts and reminds us that "eliminating discretionary
power would paralyze governmental processes and would stifle individualized
justice."54 Nonetheless, his stress in striving to reduce injustice to individuals is on
cutting back, confining, and checking discretionary power. He does not delineate
a framework for coping with categories of cases in which injustice stems from paucity
of discretion.
Daviss use of "structure" may provide a solution to this seeming overemphasis
on restricting discretion. Although he generally sandwiches references to structuring
discretionary power between calls for confining and checking it, thereby f6stering
the impression that it is another limitation, Davis's proposed instruments for struc-
turing discretion could actually help to invoke and apply it in appropriate cases
where it currently lies dormant. He notes that "structuring discretionary power
is different from confining it, although the two may overlap"; and his call for open
plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings and reasons, and open
precedents can protect against arbitrariness from failure to exercise discretion as well
as against arbitrariness from its use 5 Proper structuring of discretion, like the
constitutional principle of checks and balances, could pluralize planning and initiative
while at the same time facilitating controls over the boundaries of power.
CONCLUSION
In Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Culp Davis added a new dimension to his
already monumental contribution to the formulation, analysis, and critique of legal
facets of the administrative process. His probe and presentation of a framework
for future research into the nuances of discretion, a topic that did not qualify for
listing in the index to his Treatise a decade earlier, have been instrumental in setting
agendas for policy makers, scholars, and practitioners that will enhance the capacity
of the administrative process to be both just and fair. In the course of this article,
we have examined prototypes of projects and proposals toward these ends, such as
the Law Enforcement Study Group at Northwestern University, the Center for Police
Administration at Arizona State, Payne's observations about social workers and
Wyner's study of lieutenant governors as ombudsmen, Hill's design for determining
the nature and consequences of citizen complaints, and Getman's and Goldberg's
tests both of the validity of the NLRB's rules for elections and of the NLRB's dis-
cretion to withhold information from researchers. Works such as these will assist
in resolving the massive problems of administrative regulation today.
a 3 Tnn&usz 69.
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62 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Marver Bernstein recently decried the fact that "after nearly a century of
regulatory experience in an industrial economy, we are unable to identify, on the
basis of rigorous analysis rather than impressionistic judgments, the requisites of
acceptable administrative performance." 6 He urged that the talent and energy
devoted to -protecting the regulated from unfair procedures and to minimizing effects
adverse to regulated clienteles now be targeted on the problem of "designing and
improving systems of regulation that have a fighting chance of achieving some useful
public result.""7 Perhaps Professor Davis, having completed in Discretionary Justice
the journey to the second dimension of his professional role, just might be prepared
to lead the rest of us into administrative law's Consciousness III.
" Bernstein, Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Perspective on Their Reform, 400 AN ALs 14, 26
(,972).57 Id.
